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VOLUNTARY IMPARTIAL REVIEW OF LABOR:
SOME REFLECTIONSt

Walter E. Oberer*
" ... The bureaucratic society is one in which the citizen is remote
from the center of power and largely helpless in dealing with it. ...
[C]enters of private power have sprung up that are as bureaucratized
as the government and that are as influential, perhaps even more influential, in the lives of the citizens."
- Robert M. Hutchinst

purpose of this paper is to examine the emerging concept
of voluntary impartial review of the decisions of organizational tribunals passing upon internal disputes. Attention will center on the application of this concept to labor unions - the only
area in which it has yet been tried.

T

HE

I.

THE FUNCTION OF IMPARTIAL REVIEW

The function of voluntary impartial review is to preserve the
integrity of the organization.2 The danger to be guarded against
is that the organization will be perverted to the ends of those
who obtain control of it instead of serving the interests of the
members for which it exists. This peril is by no means peculiar
to labor unions. It is the problem, so central to our time, of the
big group and its obscuring, sometimes squelching effect upon
its members. Voluntary impartial review is calculated to lessen
this vitiating influence - to preserve the raison d'etre of the organization. Not only is this effort in obvious accord with the interests
of membership, it is also coincident with the interests of the public
through whose sufferance and grant the organization exists and is
empowered.
What is voluntary impartial review? Let us proceed by
example.
t This paper was written prior to passage of the Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act of 1959 (Landrum-Griffin), signed into law by President Eisenhower on
Sept. 14. Some provisions of the act are pertinent to the present subject, notably Title
I - "Bill of Rights of Members of Labor Organizations." - W .E.O.
• Professor of Law, University of Texas School of Law. Professor Oberer served as
the first Executive Director of the Public Review Board, International Union, UAW, for
the period 1957-1959, while on leave from the University of Texas.-Ed.
1 THE SURVIVAL OF THE FREE SocIETY, The Fund for the Republic, Bul. No. 7, May 1958,
pp. 1,5.
2 I first heard this phrase applied to impartial review by Walter Reuther.
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A. The Public Review Board of the UAW
The Public Review Board of the United Auto Workers was
created on April 8, 1957, by the biennial Constitutional Convention of the union.3 Its creation required substantial amendments
to the union constitution.4 Some four years before, in 1953, the
forerunner in this field had been similarly created by the Upholsterers' International Union.I• Whether because of the small
size of the latter union,6 the relative narrowness and lack of finality
of the jurisdictional grant,7 or other factors, the Upholsterers' appeal board has had only one case presented to it since its inception. 8 This is in contrast to the twenty-four cases reported by the
Public Review Board in its first annual report to the membership
of the UAW.9 Accordingly, one must look to the Public Review
Board for the most active experiment in voluntary impartial
review.
The jurisdiction of the board is succinctly put in article 31,
section 3 of the UAW Constitution:
"The Public Review Board shall have the authority and
duty to make final and binding decisions on all cases appealed
to it in accordance with Article 32 of the International Constitution [this article covers appeals generally], and to deal
with matters related to alleged violation of any AFL-CIO
ethical practices codes and any additional ethical practices
codes that may be adopted by the International Union."
In terms of function, then, it is perhaps more helpful than miss UAW, Proceedings, 16th Constitutional Convention 97-108 (1957).
Id. at 99-103 for the major amendments. Art 31, §1 of the UAW Constitution, for
example, provides: "For the purpose of insuring a continuation of high moral and ethical
standards in the administrative and operative practices of the International Union and its
subordinate bodies, and to further strengthen the democratic processes and appeal procedures within the Union as they affect the rights and privileges of individual members or
subordinate bodies, there shall be established a Public Review Board consisting of impartial persons of good public repute, not working under the jurisdiction of the UAW or
employed by the International Union or any of its subordinate bodies."
. Ii UIU Gen. Laws, art. XXVI, §6 (b).
6 Approximately 55,000 members, as compared to the UAW membership of over one
million. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Dept. of Labor, Bui. No. 1222, DIREcroRY OF
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LABOR UNIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 45, 31 (1957).
7 The jurisdiction is limited to appeals in disciplinary cases. See note 5 supra. Moreover, a decision of the appeal board upholding a penalty of expulsion is subject to further
appeal to the next convention of the union. UIU Gen. Laws, art. XXVI, §6 (a). Neither
of these limitations exists in the case of the Public Review Board of the UAW.
s This information is accurate as of the time of this writing. It is based on information
from the legal department of the UIU.
9 This report, covering the eighteen-month period from the creation of the board
through September 30, 1958, was published in full by the union in the December 22, 1958,
issue of Solidarity, the UAW newspaper at pp. 4-7.
4
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leading to refer to the board as a supreme court for the union as
to intra-union grievances.10 More accurately, it is one half of a dual
supreme court system, the other half being the convention. Much
of the board's jurisdiction is shared with the convention in the
sense that the appellant has an election as to which of them he
wishes to have pass upon his appeal.11 Once invoked, however,
the jurisdiction of either is final; there is no appeal from one to
the other. The uniqueness of such renunciation of power by an
organization of the size and consequence of the UAW to a tribunal
of outsiders hardly needs remark.
What is the make-up of this tribunal of outsiders? The UAW
Constitution establishes that it is to be composed of seven "impartial persons of good public repute."12 The international president proposes their names to each biennial convention for ratification, subject to the prior approval of the International Executive Board.13 The initial constituency of the body reflects its character: Rabbi Morris Adler of Congregation Shaarey Zedek, Detroit,
Chairman; Magistrate J. A. Hanrahan of the Essex County Magistrate's Court, Windsor, Ontario; Monsignor George G. Higgins
of the National Catholic Welfare Conference, Washington, D. C.;
President Clark Kerr of the University of California; Judge Wade
H. McCree of the Wayne County Circuit Court, Detroit; Bishop
G. Bromley Oxnam of the Methodist Church, Washington, D. C.;
and Dr. Edwin E. Witte, Professor Emeritus of Economics at the
University of Wisconsin.
In a sense, the UAW is the ideal vehicle for the experiment
in voluntary impartial review. Since it is free of the gross offenses
that blight too many other unions, attention may focus upon the
more basic problems of preservation of union integrity, found to
some extent in every such organization, however honest and wellJ.O As art. 31, §3 of the UAW Constitution, quoted in the text, indicates, there is a
dual character to the Public Review Board's jurisdiction: (I) It serves as the supreme
tribunal of the union as to cases appealed to it under the ordinary appellate procedure.
(2) It has additional power to act with respect to alleged violations of any AFL-CIO
or UAW ethical practices codes. In the first of these roles, the Public Review Board's
function is analogous to that of the tribunal of ultimate resort in any other judicial or
quasi-judicial system. In the second role, however, the analogy is not as accurate, there
being some circumstances under which the Public Review Board can take action on its own
motion without the necessity of an appeal. The contours of the latter power are not free
of doubt either as a matter of pertinent constitutional language or of board experience to
date. For the ethical practices codes now in effect, see note 47 infra.
11 UAW Constitution, art. 32, §8. All citations are to the constitution as amended at
the 1957 convention and in effect at the time of this writing.
J.2 Id., art. 31, §§1, 2.
'13 Id., art. 31, §2.

58

MICHIGAN

LAw

REVIEW

[Vol. 58

intentioned its leadership. These problems involve the fundamental relationship between union hierarchy and members.14
B.

The Need for Impartial Review

The problems of leadership-membership power format are
shared by all democratic institutions. There is one vital difference
in this regard, however, between the union and other "private"
organizations, on the one hand, and our subdivisions of public
government, on the other. The element of an independent judi~iary is lacking in the former. And because unions have been
insulated to a large extent from scrutiny by the public courts
through the reluctance of the courts to interfere with the internal
affairs of "voluntary" associations,15 the expense and delay of
public litigation, and the stigma of disloyalty attached to such resort by a union member,1 6 their internal functioning has been left
relatively unqualified by the "rule of law."17 The executive officers
of the union, particularly the international hierarchy, are left in
practical effect to interpret as well as to execute the law of the
union. When the ambiguity of the written word and the varietal
factual patterns to which it must be applied are considered, the
power to interpret superimposed upon the power to execute is the
power to rule.
Such is the power potentially wielded by any leadership
charged with determination of the extent of its own authority
as established by the applicable law. The UAW is no exception.
Its constitution provides that the International Executive Board
"shall decide all questions involving the interpretation of this
Constitution between Conventions"18 and "shall pass upon all
14 See KERR, UNIONS AND UNION LEADERS OF THEIR OWN CHOOSING, Fund for the Republic Pamphlets-The Free Society (Dec. 1957); Kovner, "The Legal Protection of Civil
Liberties Within Unions," 1948 WIS. L. R.Ev. 18; Hardman, "Legislating Union Democracy,"
THE NEW LEADER, Dec. 2, 1957, p. 3.
15 See Chafee, "The Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit," 43 HARV. L. R.Ev.
993 (1930); Summers, "Legal Limitations on Union Discipline," 64 HARv. L. R.Ev. 1049 at
1050-1051 (1951).
16 "Labor's long-standing distrust of the courts is reflected in the provisions in sixtysix constitutions which prohibit members from resorting to the courts until all appeals
within the union have been exhausted." Summers, "Disciplinary Powers of Unions," 3
IND. & LAB. REL. R.Ev. 483 at 503 (1950). See also Pacific Maritime Assn., 43 L.R.R.M. 1470
(1959), for an example of job discrimination by a union against an employee who had
sued to regain union membership.
17 The phrase "rule of law" is used in this paper primarily to indicate government
within the bounds and limitations established by laws, the governing officials deriving
their powers therefrom, being controlled thereby and answerable thereunder. For other
meanings of the phrase, see 6 AM. J. COMP. L. 518 (1957).
18 UAW Constitution, art. 12, §7.

,

1959]

59

IMPARTIAL REVIEW OF LABOR

claims, grievances and appeals from the decisions of subordinate
bodies of the International Union...." 19 Before creation of the
Public Review Board, the authority of the International Executive Board to interpret the law it is charged with executing was
circumscribed only by the overriding authority of the convention,
the seat of the ultimate judicial and legislative power within the
union. It requires no cynicism to appreciate the inadequacy of
a convention of some two-to-three thousand non-law-oriented delegates meeting every two years to qualify in any significant respect
the effect of the interim interpretative powers of the executive
officers.20
19 Id., art. 12, §8.
20 The great bulk

of this convention work falls to a grievance committee which is
made up of nine members appointed from the convention delegates by the International
Executive Board. UAW Constitution, art. 8, §§18, 19; UAW, Proceedings, 16th Constitutional Convention 26 (1957). [Appointment of such an appeals committee by the officers is
the general rule in unions. See Summers, "Disciplinary Procedures of Unions," 4 !ND. &:
LAB. REL. R.Ev. 15 at 25 (1950).] This committee reviews the record and hears such further
evidence and argument as the parties choose to present: It then reports its conclusions
and recommendations as to disposition of the appeals to the convention at large, usually
as one of the last items of business and under heavy pressure of time. The convention
acts on the basis of these reports and recommendations, which are sometimes augmented
by additional argument from the appellants, other parties, and the floor. Although this
cumbersome process is not "rubber-stamping," it certainly is not likely that the decisions
of the International Executive Board will be disturbed by it, a conclusion supported by
the following figures on appeals of such decisions to the last three UAW Conventions:
Appeals
Presented

Recommendations of
Grievance Committee
Affirm

Reverse Modify

1957_13
1955_ 8
1953_ 9

12
7
8

0
0
I

I
I
0

Totals _30

27

I

2

Action of Convention
on Grievance Com•
••
mittee's Recommen- Summary of Convention Dec1S1ons
dations
Accepted Rejected Affirmed
Reversed Modified
13
0
0
I
12

8
8

0
I

7
7

0
2

0

29

I

26

2

2

I

UAW, Proceedings, 16th Constitutional Convention 387-418 (1957); UAW, Proceedings,
15th Constitutional Convention 303-333 (1955); UAW, Proceedings, 14th Constitutional
Convention 33-35, 182-230, 331-367 (1953).
The sole rejection by the convention of a grievance committee recommendation came
in a case involving a simple issue and unusually strong identification of the delegates with
the appellant. The latter had been discharged from his employment for an unauthorized
absence of over three days. He claimed to have had a "lady friend" call in to report his
illness to the employer, a point controverted by the company. The question of credibility
thus raised had been resolved against appellant by the union tribunals, including the
International Executive 13oard. His grievance had accordingly not been processed to the
umpire stage by the union. After listening to a persuasive plea by the appellant and to
counter-arguments, the delegates rebelled against the felt inclination of the International
Executive Board, and of the Grievance Committee in supporting it, to side with the
employer in the resolution of a question of credibility. UAW, Proceedings, 14th Constitutional Convention 348 (1953).
For further supporting figures and similar conclusion with respect to appeals to conventions in other unions, see Summers, supra this note, at 15, 25-26. By way of contrast,
in the first six appeals decided by the Public Review Board, three resulted in reversals.
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In effect, then, absent some technique of separation of powers through impartial review, the executive power in a union runs
the union pretty much in accordance with its own ideas of fairness and organizational purpose. This is certainly true between
conventions, particularly where the union constitution has a provision like that of the UAW requiring compliance with the decision of the lower tribunal as a condition precedent to the right
of appeal.21 It is almost as true in the judicial area even after
the convention has exercised its supreme appellate power.22 If
the convention has any greater vitality in the legislative area, a
question afield from the present discussion, all it can do is to
affect prospectively the running of the union, again subject to the
interpretative power of the executive.
What is needed, then, are techniques for the control of executive power. The executive must rule not only by law if the principles of self-government and the rights of the individual are to
be preserved, it must rule under law.23
C.

The Problem of Bigness

Where the group involved is small enough to permit regular
contact among the members and their officials, the members may
be expected to contain the officials within the law the members
have formulated, and to assure responsiveness, through the personal pressures and town-meeting forums that the small group
provides. This becomes progressively more difficult as the organization grows. The member becomes more and more "remote from the center of power" and "helpless in dealing with
it."24 With increase in size comes bureaucracy.
Obviously, bureaucracy is not an evil per se. It is simply a
response to the needs of running a large, complex organization.
But in its impersonality and big-picture orientation it has a built-in
potential for suppressing the individual in the interests of the
group, or of the leadership of the group, or of the group as the
leadership perceives them. As a consequence, the individual has
21 Art. 32, §1: " ••• in all cases, however, the decision of the lower tribunal must be
complied with before the right to appeal can be accepted by the next tribunal in authority,
and shall remain in effect until reversed or modified."
22 See note 20 supra.
23 Goodhart, "The Rule of Law and Absolute Sovereignty," 106 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 943
at 947 (1958).
24 Hutchins, in THE SURVIVAL OF THE FREE SoCIETY, The Fund for the Republic, Bul.
No. 7, May 1958, pp. 1, 5a
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a need for a protecting offset that increases with the size of the
organization. This need is most acute where the organization
is of most consequence to the member. For this reason, labor
unions are apt to be the most crucial, non-public vying-ground
for the struggle between the individual and the group of which
he is a member. 25
Impartial review is no panacea for this problem. It is, however, an attempt to deal in some measure with the preservation of
legitimate individual interests within and vis-a-vis the group.

D.

The Problem of Paternalism

All of this sets the stage for what I have come to believe is the
bedrock question with respect to internal union government. It,
too, has most interesting implications for democracy generally. The
question is: to what exterit should a union be run from the top?
Put another way: how much paternalism can a democratic institution afford? And for how long? This is the bedrock problem,
in my opinion, because it is present when no other problem is present, because it is the product of good faith rather than bad faith,
because the problem is one of degree and judgment in contrast
to the other less subtle internal difficulties, and because it is the
one problem almost certain to be encountered in every union or
other large organization.26
In essence, the problem is one of competition between the
values of dynamic paternalism and of self-government. There is
much to be said on both sides since leadership is at the zenith of
need and potential in a democratic context. The problem resolves
itself into the search for a frame of reference which will accommo25 For a recent discussion of the problems involved in this struggle and a collection
of authorities, see Levitan, "Government Regulation of Internal Union Affairs Affecting
the Rights of Members," BNA DAILY LAnoR REP. No. 109, pp. 5-11 (June 4, 1958) (Special
Supp. No. 13, Library of Congress Legislative Reference Service).
26 Joseph Kovner has said: "The denial of civil liberties to union members is not a
problem requiring legal remedies because of willful union tyrannies. It is rather the result
of a common human failing of officials, who occasionally believe that they know best what
is good for the membership, and frequently maintain that criticism and opposition divide
the union and weaken its essential unity." Kovner, "The Legal Protection of Civil Liberties
Within Unions," 1948 WIS. L. REv. 18 at 19.
The problem is humorously reflected in a column by Eric Sevareid: "When clerical
employees in the national headquarters of the AFL-CIO talked about organizing their own
union, one of them, a daughter of George Meany, uttered a remark since become classic:
'Why do you want to do that? Father knows what is best for you.' " Sevareid, "The Other
Side of the Coin," THE REPORTER, Sept. 18, 1958, p. 6. See also Paul Jacobs' most pertinent
and interesting commentary upon a specific case: "Mr. Hayes Settles a Local Disturbance,"
THE REPORTER, April 2. 1959, P· 18.
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date the virtues of dynamic leadership without vitiating the principles of self-rule. In the case of labor unions, the issue is further
complicated by the frequently-asserted conflict between the "fighting mission," with its demand for discipline, and the procedures of
democracy.
Upon the answer to the problem put in the preceding paragraphs, in whatever of its forms, depends the whole thrust of impartial review. This is not to say that this tribunal of outsiders
should not also be concerned with hands in the till, self-dealing,
sham elections, and similarly gross aberrations. It is only to say
that the latter are the relatively simple problems, at least in theory,
involving application of irrefutable principles. In practice, of
course, they are very difficult problems - but not of impartial
review so much as of the criminal law. No judicial or quasijudicial review is calculated to cope with major corruption in a
union. Only police work and preventive legislation can deal with
this. 27 Nor will a corrupt leadership accept voluntarily a bona
fide system of review by outsiders. Major corruption (as opposed
to minor corruption by lesser union officials) is not then a realistic
concern for voluntary impartial review. Paternalism, on the other
hand, with its good-faith base, is not only a proper concern for such
review, it is the very essence of the problem of leadership-membership relations which gives occasion for impartial review in the
first instance.
The problem posed for impartial review by paternalism is
compounded by the necessity of having first to establish the standard to be applied in contending with it. This difficulty is best
dealt with as one of scope of review.

II.

SOME PROBLEMS IN SCOPE OF REVIEW

A.

The Problem of Standard

What is the proper standard for voluntary impartial review?
In the case of the Public Review Board of the UAW, this is a question not fully resolved by the union constitution or, at this writing,
by the board itself. Let us speculate as to the possibilities. I think
there are four alternatives, with some obvious compromises available among them. The first is to accept paternalism as a desirable,
27 George Meany is quoted as having stated: "Until the Senate hearings, we [AFL-CIO
leadership] did not know one one-hundredth of the corruption existing in the union
movement." Hardman, "Legislating Union Democracy," THE NEW LEADER, Dec. 2, 1957,
i'· 5.
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or at least inevitable, fact and to restrict review to the framework
thus established. The second is to refuse to accept a paternalistic
frame of reference and to seek criteria instead in the law of the
union. The third is to look beyond the law of the union where
deemed appropriate to the law in a larger sense, to federal and
state constitutions, statutes, judicial decisions. The fourth is to
look beyond the law as such to morality as perceived by the members of the reviewing authority.
Now let us examine the implications of acceptance of each of
these four frames of reference, in turn. First, if the desirability
or inevitability of paternalism be conceded, whether for reasons
of unique disciplinary need in the trade union context, membership apathy, or otherwise, the function of impartial review is to
assure that it remain benevolent. Such review would tend to accomplish three things: (1) fairness of decision by the standard
of benevolent paternalism, externally applied; (2) a degree of
anticipatory self-discipline by the executive power of the union;
and, of course, (3) preservation of the values of sophisticated,
streamlined leadership. The primary drawback to such an approach is that paternalism, however fair-minded, is essentially antidemocratic. The father-child relationship assumes children. Moreover, like any other variety of benevolent autocracy or oligarchy,
it holds ever within itself the seed of tyranny and its husk-mate,
corruption.
A second approach for impartial review, the one apparently
adopted by the Upholsterers for their appeal board,28 is to hew
to the line established by the law of the union. The effort would
be to apply the yardstick of at least substantial compliance with
that law - in form and in fact. Even purportedly "fair" deviation
from the forms of such law would be required to carry a heavy
burden of justification; conversely, compliance in form only would
not immunize from challenge. The virtues of review of this scope
are: (I) the powers of leadership are thus circumscribed by the
constitutional accord of the membership, which is the source of
the grant, and also by consonant by-laws and resolutions, (2) the
power of the reviewing authority itself is similarly restricted,
(3) the rights of the members under these provisions are correla28 Article XXVI, §6 (b) (iii) of the UIU General Laws provides that the decisions of
the appeal board "shall be based solely on the facts and the provisions of these General
Laws." As previously indicated, the jurisdictional grant to this board is confined to the
review of disciplinary cases. See note 7 supra.
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tively protected, and (4) summing up all of the foregoing points
in the traditional phrase of democracy, the rule would thus be one
of laws and not of men. The arguments against a review so oriented would come from two directions, I suspect. Some labor
people might be inclined to fear it as essentially legalistic, based
upon attention to the technical and the trivial and losing sight
of the overriding considerations of "fairness" and "justice," and
upon the subtly-related ground of the incompatibility of such approach and the fighting mission of the union: They might also
contend that even if such an approach is theoretically sound, as
a practical matter many union constitutions have been so loosely
drawn as not to bear close scrutiny at present. Conversely, some
people outside the ranks of labor might be inclined to belittle this
approach on the score that autocratic power can hardly be curbed
by dams which, through control of delegates and conventions, are
arguably designed by the alleged autocrats.
The third approach would involve application of a more basic
standard where the circumstances warranted. This standard might
be loosely described as "the law of the land." The tribunal would
thus have the power to look beyond, to ignore a provision of the
union's constitution which does not, for example, square with
its idea of due process of law as established by federal and state
constitutions, statutes, and judicial decisions. The favorable aspect
of such scope of review is that it affords a close approximation of
the benefits of review in an attuned public court without the
delay, expense, and stigma attaching to judicial review itself.29
29The vagaries of judicial review of decisions of union tribunals are dealt with in
Summers, "Legal Limitations on Union Discipline,'' 64 HARv. L. REv. 1049 (1951). The
usual approach in disciplinary cases (which constitute the great bulk of what cases there
are) is to require (1) that the action taken be in accordance with the rules of the organization, (2) that the proceedings pursuant to the rules be conducted in good faith, and (3)
that the rules and proceedings not be contrary to natural justice. See Chafee, "The
Internal Affairs of Associations Not for Profit,'' 43 HARV. I:.. REv. 993 at 1014 (1930). The
third factor is frequently put in terms of "reasonableness" or "fairness." See, e.g., Taxicab
Drivers Local 889 v. Pittman, (Okla. 1957) 41 L.R.R.M. 2045. "Natural justice" operates
not only to fill gaps in the procedural rules of the organization, but also to upset an
express rule which is contrary thereto. "The principle is thus a sort of unwritten 'due
process' clause which invalidates the statute of the association. Its meaning is equally
vague." Chafee, supra, at 1015-1016. Cf. Spayd v. Ringing Rock Lodge, 270 Pa. 67, 113
A. 70 (1921) (expulsion for petitioning legislature for repeal of "full crew law,'' in violation of union rule, held invalid under state bill of rights); Gilmore v. Palmer, 109 Misc.
552, 179 N.Y.S. 1 (1919) (suspension without hearing under union rule providing for such
summary action held invalid). See Crossen v. Duffy, 90 Ohio App. 252, 103 N.E. (2d) 769
(1951).
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The need for resort to the courts is accordingly minimized. The
chief drawback to this scope of review is that, by definition, it
'involves going beyond the clear grant of power to the impartial
tribunal contained in the union's constitution. Such reaching out
for power would tend to undermine the confidence so essential
to the successful functioning of any judicial system, but even more
so a voluntary one, of those subject to the jurisdiction. The antipathy of organized labor, rooted in history, to the overreaching
for power by the courts would tend to aggravate the felt offense.
The fourth approach involves the freest review of all - as farreaching as the concepts of morality held by the members of the
tribunal. In the case of an essentially lay tribunal such as the
Public Review Board of the UAW, reasonable contention can be
made for such breadth of review. Not only are five of the seven
members not law-trained, but the emphasis upon the "public"
character of the review suggests a submission of the union's operation to measurement by the public conscience as sampled at a
high level. This thought is further substantiated by the specific
make-up of the board. Its membership is drawn from three of
the main morality-shaping institutions of our society - church,
school, and judiciary. Although there is something noble in the
idea of review by such lofty standards, it would seem upon analysis to be but another form of paternalism. Or, if you choose,
a paternalism superimposed upon paternalism - a kind of grandfather-father-child hierarchy. If right-and-wrongness as conceived
by the board is to be the final test, any conflicting provision of the
union constitution is obviously deprived of force. One of the byproducts of the application of this standard might well be an unnecessarily heavy volume of appeals; no matter how clear a provision of the union constitution was on a given point, no one
could be sure whether the impartial tribunal, applying its particular moral insight, would choose to give it effect. This fourth
approach would have the prime drawback of paternalism at the
union level, the anti-democratic thrust, without the one real compensating value of such paternalism - streamlined, sophisticated
leadership.
Of the four suggested standards for impartial review, the second - the law of the union - seems to me the most appropriate
as a point of departure. The rule of law is thus brought to bear
upon the internal government of the organization through impartial application of the very regulations the membership has agreed
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to be bound by. The values of dynamic leadership may thus be
contained within the framework of self-rule.
B.

Impartial Review and Organizational Purpose:
Of Ends and Means

It is obvious that the integrity of an organization can be subverted through perversion of its facilities and power to other than
the purpose for which it exists. An example of this is where the
leadership of a union utilizes the union for self-aggrandizement,
such as financial gain and personal power, in a fashion opposed to
the interests of the membership. In such circumstances the leaders
involved are apt to look upon the union in proprietary fashion.
There is, moreover, a subtler variety of proprietorship, growing
out of the understandable feeling of having helped to build the
union through personal sacrifice and of holding, as a consequence,
the interest of a major, if philanthropic, investor. The investment
is in a mission, and the missionary impulse is not always consonant with that of democracy. The zeal of the missionary, although insulating against personal aggrandizement and corruption, tends to be at odds with the compromises inherent in democracy. The exception, of course, is where the mission itself is that
of bringing a fuller democracy to the group.
What, then, is the purview of impartial review with respect to
organizational purpose? It is important here, it seems to me, from
the standpoint of the implications of self-government, to recognize
the essential merging of ends and means in the concept of organizational "purpose." In the case of a labor union, the end, put one
way, is to further the interests of the members vis-a-vis· the employer, and perhaps also in a larger sense. But what are the "interests of the members?" I know of no more democratic or otherwise reliable guide to these interests than is set up by the members
in their own organic law. This law indicates the general character
of the membership interest. It also specifies (or should) the means
by which this general, group end is to be particularized and sought
after in the specific case. In this way, the "purpose" of the union
in the concrete situation is always the product of the means established in the union law for developing it; the end thus becomes
what the means produce. Moreover, the general purpose itself is
always subject to reformulation by the means specified in that
law. Included in the means, fully conceived, are the rights of the
members inter se and vis-a-vis the organization. In a sense, the very
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reason for such rights is to define and protect the process of particularizing and reformulation by which the policies of the union
are in constant state of determination.30
The proper concern of voluntary impartial review seems to
me to be the means, not the ends as such. For example, it should
not be the function of such review to pass upon claims by disgruntled members that the union has acted beyond its powers in
pressing a particular collective bargaining demand, such as profitsharing, assuming the demand to have been developed by the
processes set forth in the union law. The basis for such claim of
ultra vires might be that profit-sharing is not within the purpose
for which the union was created because it does not relate directly
enough to wages, hours, and working conditions. I am convinced
that voluntary impartial review cannot afford this scope for several reasons. First, such matters are of a political nature in the
sense of the "political questions" typically excepted from the jurisdiction of the public courts; they are not properly within the
ambit of the judicial function, but are legislative or executive in
character.31 Second, to attempt to contain the organizational thrust
in this fashion would tend to restrict internal democracy rather
than to facilitate it; this would run counter to the whole purpose
of impartial review. Third, exercise of jurisdiction over such matters would draw the impartial tribunal into the political arena,
both internal and external, and would, in turn, impeach its impartiality to the point of destruction of membership, leadership,
and public confidence; it would no longer be "above the battle."
Lastly, as a practical matter, no union could assume the risk of
voluntary imposition of impartial review of such scope.
These objections are not encountered in the "means" area.
Here, the force of impartial review is in complete accord with the
processes of internal democracy and is "above the battle" to the
extent consistent with getting the job done. As favorable a climate
as possible for fulfilling its function is thereby assured. The legitimacy or illegitimacy of the ends sought by the organization vis-a30 Professor Slichter's provocatively simple observation is in point: "Democracy is
needed in trade unions because there is room for great differences among the members in the
objectives of unions, in their policies, and in the ways in which they conduct their affairs."
SLICHTER, CHALLENGE OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 100 (1947).
31 See, generally, Field, "The Doctrine of Political Questions in the Federal Courts," 8
MINN. L. REv. 485 (1924). The treaty-making power is perhaps the most apposite example
of political question. Professor Slichter has pertinently noted, "A trade union may be
compared to a national government which is engaged in the main in conducting foreign
relations." SLICHTER, CHALLENGE OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 22 (1947).
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vis outsiders would thus be left where it seems to me to belong,
with the public tribunals, Congress, and the larger law.
In the case of the Public Review Board of the UAW, the constitutional amendments creating and empowering it have wisely
mooted the problem of jurisdiction over collective bargaining matters by reserving jurisdiction to the union tribunals. The only
power expressly granted to the board in this area is that contained
in article 32, section 8 (b), which provides:
"where the appeal concerns the action or inaction relative to
the processing of a [shop] grievance, the jurisdiction of the
Public Review Board shall be limited to those instances where
the appellant has alleged before the International Executive
Board that the grievance was improperly handled because of
fraud, discrimination, or collusion with management."
Obviously, where "fraud, discrimination, or collusion with management" is claimed to be present, means rather than ends are involved and the integrity of the union is in issue.
C.

Ambiguity in the Law of the Union

The question of whether ambiguity in fact exists in the union
law, and the further question of how to deal with it, should be
resolved, I think, on the basis both of trade-union point of view
and of the impact of the larger Iaw.32 The importance of the
larger law derives from at least two considerations. First, since the
power of review exists in the civil courts, that law is likely to be,
in any event, the ultimate measure of the ambiguous provision.83
32 To similar effect in the general area of labor arbitration, see ELKOURI, How AruuTRATION WoRKS 132, 136, 169-170 (1952), and arbitration cases there noted.
"But does the Arbitrator have any right to be concerned about the legal consequences
of his award? .•. It is the opinion of this arbitrator that he is bound by the Agreement
between the parties. However, that Agreement and the legal framework within which it
operates are not avo separate and distinct entities. Rather, the Agreement is what it means
within the legal framework of the society within which it operates." Arbitrator Abernathy
in F. H. Hill Co., Inc., 8 LAB. ARB. REP. 62 at 65 (1947), quoted in ELKoURI at 170.
83 See, generally, Summers, "Legal Limitations on Union Discipline," 64 HARv. L. REv.
1049 (1951). The reviewing courts have not considered themselves bound by the union's
interpretation of procedural or substantive provisions of its law but have instead made
independent interpretations where the circumstances warranted. E.g., Blek v. Wilson, 145
Misc. 373, 259 N.Y.S. 443 (1932) (provision authorizing local executive board to "hear and
determine the matter summarily" improperly construed by union as allowing suspension
without providing plaintiff with notice and copy of charges); Smetherham v. Laundry
Workers' Union, 44 Cal. App. (2d) 131, Ill P. (2d) 948 (1941) (assault and battery upon
another member not a violation of union provision that "no member shall injure the
interests of another member by undermining him • • . in wages, or in any other wilful
manner ..."); Leo v. Local Union No. 612 of Intl. Union of Operating Engineers, 26 Wash.
(2d) 498, 174 P. (2d) 523 (1946) (soliciting members for rival union not a violation of
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In cases where judicial review will actually be sought, there is
obvious value in anticipation of the decision likely to be rendered
by the court. And in cases where judicial review will not be sought,
for whatever reason, it seems in keeping with simple justice that
the decision rendered by the impartial tribunal be as close an
approximation as possible of what a well-advised civil court might
have ruled. The aggrieved member who is impecunious or is unwilling to seek review in the courts because of a sense of loyalty
to the union is thus dealt with in similar fashion to the one with
funds and inclination for such resort. Second, and perhaps more
fundamental, reference to the larger law for criteria would have
the added value of defining more sharply the sources of guidance
for impartial review and of maximizing the integrity of such guidance. The rule of law would thus be fully promoted.
It may be seen that treatment of the matter of ambiguities in
the union law in the manner suggested accomplishes an effective
reconciliation in many cases of the second and third approaches,
previously mentioned, to the proper scope of impartial review,
the criterion of the former being the law of the union and of the
latter being the law in a larger sense. Most of the cases of sufficient consequence to result in appeal to the impartial review board
will turn upon provisions of the union law which are subject to
more than one interpretation as applied to the circumstances in
issue. To the extent, then, that the larger law is looked to in such
cases for the standards of determination, there is a blending of the
criteria of the law of the union and of the larger law. Similarly,
to the extent the larger law equates with a properly-conceived
morality (as, it is submitted, it either does or should), there is also

union provision against "creating dissension"); Polin v. Kaplan, 257 N.Y. 277, 177 N.E.
833 (1931) (original civil suit against union officers for misappropriation of union funds
not a violation of provision requiring exhaustion of rights of appeal within union). See
Summers, supra this note, at 1061-1062, 1077-1079.
The courts may, of course, review more narrowly the decisions of impartial review
boards than of other union tribunals. This should tend to be true as a matter of psychology, if nothing more. Even as a matter of articulation of standard, some curtailment
of review might be accomplished through analogizing to arbitration awards. The
American Civil Liberties Union has, in fact, recommended that the decisions of impartial review boards be made "enforceable by legal action, as a binding arbitration
award." ACLU, "Democracy in Labor Unions, A Report and Statement of Policy," first
published in 1952 and reprinted in a pamphlet entitled A LABOR UNION "BILL OF RIGHTS,"
DEMOCRACY IN LABOR UNIONS, THE KENNEDY-IVES BII.L-STATEMENTS BY THE AMERICAN
CIVIL LmERTIES UNION, at 25 (Sept. 1958). [This 1958 publication will be cited hereinafter
at ACLU, DEMOCRACY IN LABOR UNIONS.] Decisions of arbitrators are narrowly reviewed
for such factors as fraud and want of jurisdiction. See UPDEGRAFF AND McCoY, ARBITRATION
OF LABOR DISPtm:s 124-127 (1946).
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an accommodation of the fourth approach to the scope of impartial review, viz., application of the criteria of morality.
Resort to the larger law for guidance wherever the union law
is indecisive would result in resolution of the more fundamental
ambiguities on the basis of considerations of due process, civil
liberties, and basic public policy. I believe, moreover, that impartial reviewers should be quick to perceive ambiguity wherever
such considerations are involved; 84 they should be most reluctant
to accord meaning to a provision of the union law which would
result in a denial of essential rights. 85 Ambiguities not resoluble
at the level of these primary considerations would then be dealt
with in the fashion in which meaning must always be given to
ambiguity within the framework of reason, through resort to the
circumstances. Trade union perspective would here, of course, be
vital.
At least two further benefits would seem to follow from the
foregoing orientation. First, the emphasis upon the larger law in
the area of doubt would tend to underscore the need for lawtrained, law-disciplined personnel in impartial review. Second,
such emphasis would lead the union hierarchy to a greater reliance upon its own legal staff in the internal area where greater
reliance of this sort would prove most salutary. Anticipatory seeking of legal advice by the leadership as to internal matters would
be in marked contrast to the situation frequently existing at present
where the legal staff of the union is not consulted until after the
action has been taken, and then for the purposes of repair.
A corollary to placing the power of interpretation of union
law in an impartial review board is to deprive the union executive
of the power to shape that law to its own ends through mere
interpretation. And where the review board is oriented to a close
consideration of that law, in the context of the larger law, it becomes obvious that the executive must either be restricted in the
exercise of power or seek a clearer grant from the membership or
84 This accords with the canon of statutory construction against interpretations raising
questions of constitutionality. " ..• [E]ven if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised,
it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the
statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided." Crowell v. Benson, 285
U.S. 22 at 62 (1932).
35 The American Civil Liberties Union has declared that "the recognition of three
basic rights of individual workers is the minimum essential to union democracy." These
are: (1) the right to participate freely in the processes of self-government, (2) the right to
equal treatment with all others governed by the union, (3) the right to a fair trial before
being subjected to any penalty or deprived of any rights of membership. ACLU, DEMOCRACY IN l.ABOR UNIONS at 11.
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their delegates. This, in my judgment, is an entirely proper concomitant of the application of the rule of law to internal union
affairs. One of three things will result. (I) The leadership will be
reluctant to ask for the bald grant of power, either for internal
or external political reasons. (2) The leadership will not be reluctant to ask, but the membership will refuse to grant the express
power. (3) The leadership will ask and the membership will
grant the power. It is difficult to argue against any of these three
alternatives from the premise of self-rule.

D.

The Impact of the "Fighting Mission"

A common argument against fuller democracy for the internal
union is that this would be incompatible with the needs of the
union as a fighting organization.36 The army analogy is frequent
here. But unions today can hardly be contended to be army-like
all of the time. If they were, a prime reason for their being would
be contravened-the seeking of dignity and self-rule in the employment environment.37
Accordingly, an approach must be found that will accommodate
the validities of the "fighting mission" and the "hostile climate"38
without unduly prejudicing democratic values. Analogy to our
national society has been suggested.39 The latter has, in a sense, a
fighting mission, the fight for freedom - a continuing struggle,
as frequently emphasized. And yet, we do not permit the possibility or even imminence of strife, external or internal, to preclude
36 See the discussion of this and problems of internal democracy generally in Levitan,
"Government Regulation of Internal Union Affairs Affecting the Rights of Members,"
BNA DAILY LAB. REP. No. 109, pp. 5•11 Gune 4, 1958.).
37 For a forceful statement of this fundamental need of workers and function of unions
in an industrialized society, see Katz, "Minimizing Disputes Through the Adjustment of
Grievances," 12 LAW AND CoNTEM. PROB. 249-252 (1947); Summers, "Union Powers and
Workers' Rights," 49 MICH. L. R.Ev. 805 at 820 (1951).
As stated in the ACLU, DEMOCRACY IN LABOR UNIONS, at IO: " ••• unions should be
democratic because their principal moral justification is that they introduce an element
of democracy into the government of industry. They permit workers to have a voice in
determining the conditions under which they shall work. This high objective of industrial
democracy can be fulfilled only if unions which sit at the bargaining table are themselves
democratic."
38 For graphic description of these environmental factors, see Summers, "Disciplinary
Powers of Unions," 3 IND. &: LAB. REL. R.Ev. 483 at 489 (1950); Summers, "Union Powers
and Workers' Rights," 49 MICH. L. R.Ev. 805 at 818 (1951).
39 See Summers, "Union Powers and ·workers' Rights," 49 MICH, L. R.Ev. 805 at 819
(1951); Summers, "Disciplinary Procedures of Unions," 4 IND. &: LAB. REL. R.Ev. 15 at 30·31
(1950); ACLU, DEMOCRACY IN LABoR UNIONS, at 4; Williams, "The Political Liberties of
Labor Union Members," 32 TEX. L. R.Ev. 826 at 829, 832·833 (1954); Crossen v. Duffy, 90
Ohio App. 252 at 270·272, 103 N.E. (2d) 769 (1951).
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the observance of the values which underlie a democratic society.
On the contrary, we deal with this problem in the framework of
the very law which gives structure to such a society and protection
to the rights of membership therein. Thus, our national government has the power under the Constitution not only to mobilize
the citizenry but to declare martial law when the need exists.
Under martial law many democratic rights are suspended out of
consideration for more basic interests endangered at the moment.
But because of concern over the possible permanent loss of the suspended rights through too facile resort to martial law, certain protections have been developed in the process of reconciling the rule
of law with the occasional emergency which must be dealt with in
streamlined fashion.
Why not a similar accommodation for the union?4° If under
some circumstances the union cannot afford the impedimenta of
democracy, why not deal frankly with these in the union constitution? When the union is fighting or girding to fight - when
it becomes truly army-like - why not a mobilization or martiallaw equivalent, with appropriate built-in protections? Conversely,
why operate under a military philosophy when the "fight" is not
only cold but conducted in refined fashion under the rule of law
established in a long-term collective bargaining agreement, complete with its own judicial system for the resolution of disputes
arising thereunder and culminating in impartial arbitration? The
choices would seem to be (1) an unqualifiedly democratic approach to internal union affairs, (2) a democratic approach qualified only where necessary and then within well-defined bounds,
themselves democratically established, and (3) an approach
assertedly democratic but subject to ill-defined qualification imposed from above on the vague basis of a "fighting mission." It is
no mere coincidence that (2) is the middle road. 41
40 The analogy is not perfect. Arthur Goldberg has pointed out that a salient difference between the union and our political society is that the latter continues no matter
who wins a particular election or what other discontent may arise. The union, on the
other hand, is perennially subject to complete overthrow, in decertification proceedings, by
another union, through employer-encouraged attrition. See Goldberg, "Union Democracy: A Trade Union Viewpoint," an unpublished paper presented at the Fund for the
Republic conference on "Labor in a Free Society" at Arden House, Harriman, New York,
May 10, 1958. See also Summers, "Union Powers and Workers' Rights," 49 MICH. L. REv.
805 at 818 (1951). Professor Slichter has sharpened the analogy by comparing the union to
a national government "engaged in the main in conducting foreign relations." SLIGHTER,
CHALLENGE OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 22 (1947).
41 Unions already make substantial use of this approach. Many union constitutions
expressly authorize the international officers to suspend the normal government of a local
union, take control of its property, and conduct its affairs under some form of trusteeship.
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THE CHARACTER OF THE IMPARTIAL TRIBUNAL

The Labor Union "Bill of Rights" recently adopted by the
American Civil Liberties Union incorporates as one of the elements of "due process within the union," applicable in all disciplinary proceedings against union members, a "final review by
an outside board."42 This "Bill of Rights" goes on to state:
"Such review shall be conducted by an impartial person
or persons (I) selected by the membership of the union on a
regular or term basis in advance of the filing of charges, or
(2) agreed to by the labor organization and the accused, or
(3) if no such person or persons have been selected or agreed
to, designated, upon request therefore [sic], by an impartial association or group such as the American Arbitration Association, state mediation bodies, or the like. " 43
It should be noted that this admirable statement of principle
does not go as far with respect to impartial review as do the provisions of the UAW Constitution empowering the Public Review
Board. This is true even though elsewhere in the ACLU's "Bill
of Rights" impartial review is also provided of actions by an international union which "deprive a local of its right to conduct
its own affairs through trusteeship or other devices. " 44 The Public Review Board's jurisdiction is broader in that, in addition to
encompassing review of any disciplinary action within the union
and of any imposition of, what are called in the UAW, administratorships,45 it also reaches

(I) "any other cases in which the International Executive
Board has passed upon an appeal from the action of a subordinate body ... ;"46
These provisions can be criticized because of vagueness of standards and inadequacy of
procedure for determining the fact of necessity which justifies such action. "The vagueness of most constitutional provisions regarding receiverships is exceeded only by their
breadth." Cox, "The Role of Law in Preserving Union Democracy," 72 HARv. L. REV.
609 at 639 (1959).
42DEMOCRACY IN LABOR UNIONS, at 6-7. This "Bill of Rights" was adopted by the
ACLU on March 21, 1958. Id. at 3.
43Idat7.
44 Id. at 6: "If a reasonable number (such as 20 per cent) of the membership of the
local affected requests it, there should be a prompt review of the international union's
action [in imposing the trusteeship] by an outside review board."
45 UAW Constitution, art. 32, §8 (a).
46 Id., art. 32, §8 (b).
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(2) "matters related to alleged violation of any AFL-CIO
ethical practices codes and any additional ethical practices
codes that may be adopted by the International Union." 47
Two observations seem pertinent at this point. First, the maintenance of union integrity requires a jurisdictional grant to the
impartial reviewers broad enough to accomplish a separation of
the executive power and the ultimate judicial power within the
union. Thus only can the union leadership be effectively made
subject to the law it is charged with executing. Second, since the
impartial reviewing authority thereby has the final responsibility
of interpreting the law of the union, there is obvious virtue in
stability and continuity of that body. It is in the role of a supreme
court for the union, and supreme courts do not function on an
ad hoc basis. Accordingly, the first of the three alternatives posed
by the ACLU as to the character of the impartial tribunal seems
most appropriate, at least as applied to the larger, well-established
unions.
If, then, it is desirable to have impartial review on other than
an ad hoc basis, what should be the character of the tribunal? A
provocative approach to this question is to ask why would not a
permanent-umpire system, as provided for under many collective
bargaining agreements, be a more practicable handling of the matter than the seven-man Public Review Board of the UAW or the
nine-man Appeal Board of the Upholsterers. The problems of the
geographical dispersal of the union members and of bringing the
tribunal to the aggrieved member in order to give reality to his
paper rights would thus be resolved. But the umpire (as the name
itself connotes) is called upon to decide between adversaries of
near-equal strength in disputes between union and employer. They
mutually select him, they mutually pay him, and he is subject to
being unseated at the displeasure of either. In short, all of the
obvious factors of influence, conscious and subconscious, operate
to objectify him. The considerations are the other way with respect
to the tribunal impartially reviewing intra-organizational decisions. Such a tribunal does not decide between near-equals. It
47 Id., art. 31, §3. In effect, this provision of the UAW Constitution incorporates by
reference the AFL-CIO Ethical Practices Codes. Six of these had been promulgated at the
time of this writing. Their coverage is indicated by their titles: I. Local Union Charters;
II. Health and Welfare Funds; III. Racketeers, Crooks, Communists, and Fascists; IV. Investments and Business Interests of Union Officials; V. Financial Practices and Proprietary
Activities of Unions; A. Minimum Accounting and Financial Controls; VI. Union Democratic Processes. AFL-CIO, Codes of Ethical Practices, Publication No. 50 (June 1957).
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decides, in one degree or another, between the strong and the weak
- the big organization and the little member or the little segment
of membership. In a sense, its very function is to protect the weak
from the strong. The obvious factors of influence here operate to
bias the tribunal, to deneutralize it.
What does this suggest respecting the constituency of the
tribunal? We are dealing with a kind of judiciary for the union
and a judiciary without independence exists in name only. Moreover, the forces undercutting independence are here at flood-tide.
How, then, is independence to be achieved? The following factors
should be considered. First, it is probably better that the tribunal
be multiple in membership since there is more security against
influence in numbers. Second, it is essential that the membership
of the union have the determinative voice in the selection of the
personnel of the tribunal. Third, the members of the tribunal
should be appointed for definite terms, at least as long as the interval between constitutional conventions.48 Fourth, it is desirable
that the members of the tribunal be sufficiently independent of the
job itself to make it of not too great consequence to them financially or otherwise.49 Fifth, although the union provides operating
funds, the financial relationship should be set up to assure maximum independence.50 Sixth, the analogy to the judiciary suggests the value of training in legal discipline. A seventh factor
is the highly personal one of strength of character and perspicacity
of the individuals under consideration. Eighth, the tribunal's sense
of independence will to some extent reflect the power it feels itself
to have to enforce compliance with its decisions. Such power must
depend to a considerable extent upon the ability to activate pub48 The ACLU has urged that the members of such a tribunal "be appointed for a
long term and removable only for misconduct, thereby freeing these boards of the political
pressures within the union which make present union procedures inadequate." DEMOC·
RACY IN LABOR UNIONS, at 25. There is, however, some difficulty to making such appointments for longer than the period between union conventions. The latter are, as in the
case of the UAW, the seats of the highest union authority, possessed of plenary constitutional power each time that they meet.
40 Art. 31, §8 of the UAW Constitution provides that the annual budget presented by
the Public Review Board to the union shall include "reasonable compensation" for its
members.
50 For example, art. 31, §8 of the UAW Constitution provides that the Public Review
Board shall present to the union its annual budget covering all anticipated items of expenditure. The International Secretary-Treasurer is thereupon "instructed and authorized
to deposit quarterly in a depository designated by the Public Review Board to the account
of the Public Review Board the necessary funds required by the budget submitted by
them."
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lie opinion.51 This, in tum, is dependent upon the opinion the
public holds of the members of the tribunal. A final qualifying
factor is that while the tribunal's independence of the union is
a requisite, antagonism to it is entirely out of order. The purpose
of impartial review is not to destroy, but to maintain the integrity
of the organization.
The above criteria, applied to the constituency of the UAW
Public Review Board, might indicate perhaps an inadequate number of law-trained members. This is not to suggest that the entire
membership of an impartial tribunal should be drawn from the bar.
There is much to be said for leavening with the lay point of view.
This is especially true in the labor area where suspicion as to the
law and lawyers continues stro:11g. On the other hand, what we are
dealing with in the internal organizational area is not essentially
different from what is found in society at large - the problems are
those of the relationships between and among individuals and
groups of individuals, the strong and the weak, their rights and
duties inter se. This is the very stuff of law. To deny the value
of law training and law discipline in dealing with these internal
relationships is to deny it in the national and international communities as well.
If, then, the constituency of the particular board satisfies the
criteria of independence, including independence of the job itself,
how is it going to get the work done in the face of the demands of
the primary occupations of its members? There are the elements
of a true dilemma here, especially when viewed in terms of a
labor-wide application of voluntary impartial review, since the
factors of efficiency and independence tend to counter one another.
Where the problem is most apt to manifest itself is in delay in the
disposition of cases. There are worse things than slow justice, but
delay is of particular concern in relationships as vital and volatile
as those usually present in internal union disputes.
While well-conceived procedures can mitigate this difficulty,
they cannot obviate it. A case in point is the one not infrequently
encountered by the Public Review Board where the appellant
desires to present additional evidence to the board. A rule has
been formulated permitting the board to receive such evidence
in a proper case either directly or through a record made before
51 The ACLU recommends in this connection that the "union constitution ... should
provide that the order of the [impartial review] board could be enforceable by legal action,
as a binding arbitration award." DEMOCRACY IN LABOR UNIONS, at 25.
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a hearing examiner. Although the latter procedure protects the
busy board members from the time lost in hearing voluminous
testimony, it nonetheless leaves them with the burden of decision
based upon a review of that record and of written and oral argument before the board itself should the latter be offered.
Another time-saver for the Public Review Board, incorporated
into the UAW Constitution itself, permits the disposition of cases
by panels of board members numbering no less than three.52 If
it were not for this provision, the functioning of the· board would
be utterly unresponsive to the needs of the situation. With it,
the board has been able to discharge its function, but only with
the delay implicit in its being made up of very busy personnel.
The Upholsterers have sought to deal with this practical problem with respect to their appeal board in two ways: (I) they have
created a larger tribunal, numbering nine members; 53 (2) they
have empowered that tribunal to act with only one member sitting.54 This double-edged serving of expediency may well be at
the expense of factors of greater persuasion. For example, the
independence of the tribunal is apt to be diluted, absent other
controls, as the responsibility for decision is attributable to fewer
men; the moral support of the "team" is thus denied. Moreover,
the effectiveness of the tribunal as a supreme court for the union
is also diluted with fewer members actually participating in the
decisional process: the decision is less likely to reflect the contagion of idea so important to any deliberative group; its precedent,
its standard-setting value is weakened, both intrinsically and as a
matter of esteem. The disadvantages of ad hoc arbitration in a
continuing relationship thus tend to apply.55
Where are the qualified members for impartial review boards
to be found?5 6 Independence and availability they must have.
Sophistication as to labor and the law they should have. A suggested source of personnel is the faculties of schools of law and
52 Arts.

31, §5, and 32, §10.
UIU Constitution does not specify the number of members for the appeal
board. However, nine members have been designated. Professor Cox is the chairman.
UIU JOURNAL, March, 1957, p. 8.
54 UIU Gen. Laws, art. XXVI, §6 (b)(iii): "The Chairman [of the appeal board] shall,
at his discretion, designate one or more, but not exceeding three, members of the Appeal
Board ... to consider and determine the appeal••.•"
55 See ELKoURI, How ARBITRATION Worucs 40-41 _(1952).
56 One eminent observer has declared: ". . • the woods are not full • . . of the exceptional breed of 'watchdog committee' the UAW secured. Ultimately, it is illusory to
depend on public-spirited citizens to engage en masse in laundering union conflicts." Hardman, "Legislating Union Democracy," THE NEW LEADER, Dec. 2, 1957, p. 7.
53 The
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related disciplines. These schools have a responsibility, in my
judgment, to provide a pool of disinterested experts for just such
purposes as this. Such persons are devoted to teaching and scholarship. Participation in impartial review should be academically
worthwhile, apart from the additional financial and other considerations. They would accordingly benefit in a way which would
assure enthusiasm without impairing objectivity.
Another source of personnel for impartial review is the clergy.
Few people out of the main stream of organized labor have as
sincere concern for and understanding of the human problems in
this area as the sizable body of ministers, priests, and rabbis who
have found the time and inclination for such contact. They
are, moreover, uniquely sensitized by the very nature of their work
to the individual and group values which must be counterpoised
in the process of impartial review. Their independence of pressures off the merits has often the strength of rare conviction. I
know of no better group from which to leaven what I believe
should be essentially a law-oriented function.
A third potential source is among the superannuated. Too
little use is made of this national resource, in any event. I have
in mind professors emeritus, elder statesmen of labor, of government, retired or semi-retired churchmen, judges, newspapermen,
writers, lawyers, etc. - in short, those who have the wisdom of
experience, the availability of relaxed pursuit of livelihood, the
independence of age.
IV.

FURTHER PROBLEMS AND BENEFITS OF IMPARTIAL REVIEW

A.

The Problem of Relevance

There are few experts in relevance trying cases to or sitting on
union tribunals. As a consequence, the records are long and the
issues often obscured. This reflects the political flavor of the
disputes involved, enhanced by the abrasion of close relationship,
and the naivete of the parties and the union tribunals with respect
to the refinement of issues in a judicial-type proceeding.
Since the context of union cases is political, it is hardly surprising that political considerations should affect union tribunals.
What other criteria are available to them? The personnel is anything but law-disciplined; thus, the rule-of-law approach in any
effective sense is impeded. The apparent alternatives are two
which seem really only varying degrees of one. The first- applied
in cases which concededly involve union politics, either in the
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narrow, personal sense or in the broader, policy sense -is the
politics of the tribunal. The second is that chameleon "fairness."
But what is most apt to be the measure of fairness to a tribunal
rooted in politics in a case with political undercurrents?5 7 And
cases without political implications are apt to be rarely encountered among those of consequence for impartial review.
What is the effect of these political considerations upon the
presentation to the impartial reviewers?58 First, they inherit, in
the record from below, the divided direction of the proceedings
before the union tribunals. Second, they are confronted in the
proceedings before them with the same ambiguous criteria of
relevance. At both levels, the issues for decision in the immediate
case tend to become lost in the larger political issues. The participants - parties, witnesses, and, in the case of the union tribunals,
members of the tribunal - often speak for the record with the
instinct of political tactitians, justifying past actions and spading
for future ones in a fashion little restricted by the issues in the
case. In short, all involved are concerned to some extent with
making a record for themselves.
Nor is this expansion of relevance, with its wasteful and fogging
effect upon the particular hearing and the record, readily control117 See Summers, "Disciplinary Procedures of Unions,'' 4 IND. 8c LAB. REL. R.Ev. 15 at
19, 22-25, 29-30 (1950).
"The judicial machinery by which discipline cases are tried is so interlocked with
the political machinery by which policies are made that discipline may become a political
football. It will at least be colored by political forces if not a deliberate weapon of
political power. The right to an unbiased tribunal will be guaranteed only when unions
establish within their structure a truly independent judiciary." ACLU, DEMOCRACY IN
LABOR UNIONS, at 20-21.
118 Strong contention has been made that "no amount of appeal to impartial appellate
tribunals can cure the root defect of a biased trial under the restrictive appellate rules
that are second-nature in our judicial system today." Williams, "The Political Liberties
of Labor Union Members,'' 32 TEX. L. R.Ev. 826 at 833 (1954). See also Summers, "Legal
Limitations on Union Discipline," 64 HARV. L. REv. 1049 at 1082-1084 (1951). Without
denying the force of this argument, three qualifying considerations are suggested: (I) Voluntary impartial review can afford more flexibility, breadth, and depth of inquiry for such
bias than can the civil courts. (2) To impose the requirement of initial trial before outsiders may be unrealistic in terms of expense and general membership reaction; a "cure"
of such invasive proportions might well import its own diseases. (3) It is possible to
maximize the impartiality of a union trial tribunal through improved techniques of selection; the UAW, for example, at the 1957 convention which created the Public Review
Board also amended its constitutional procedure so as to provide for the selection of trial
tribunals by lot from among the members, with a certain number of peremptory challenges
being permitted to each side. Art. 30, §7.
The proposal of the ACLU in its Labor Union "Bill of Rights" is that "the trial
committee shall be composed of impartial persons who are not, by virtue of office, responsible to the individual or individuals making the charges, or selected, if agreement cannot
otherwise be achieved, from an agency or group completely outside the union." DEMOCRACY IN LABOR UNIONS, at 7.
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!able within the framework of impartial review. To a large extent,
impartial review must inherit the traditions of the union. In the
UAW these are most relaxed. Interestingly, there is a real value in
such relaxed standards here. The one thing perhaps more important in the work of a tribunal than doing justice is imparting a
sense of justice having been done. This objective is frequently
thwarted through the stringent application of standards of relevance too subtle for laymeI_l to comprehend. In the courts this concern is mitigated by the fact that all parties are represented by
counsel who understand the evidentiary rules being applied and
can interpret them for their clients. No such amelioration is available in union proceedings where lawyers are the exception rather
than the rule. 59 Nor is it so necessary in the UAW in view of the
relaxed procedure followed at the union level. The principle
there applied is one of catharsis. Everyone involved is permitted
to say pretty much what he chooses to say, subject, of course, to the
inhibiting presence of union peers and superiors who may be
expected to seek retribution in the expanded political forum. Not
only is everyone given the opportunity to "get the load off his
chest," he is almost required to do so. A remarkable effect of this
in the more successful UAW hearings is that somewhere near the
three-quarter mark, the aggrieved become conciliatory. They begin to profess their confidence in the tribunal, the possibility of
error on their part, their willingness to accept in good spirit an adverse decision should that result. Between the obvious values of
catharsis, on the one hand, and of efficiency, on the other, liei a
mild dilemma of voluntary impartial review.

B.

The Passive Benefit

The prime contribution of the Public Review Board of the
UAW, I am convinced, is the mere fact of being. Whatever its
scope of review, its very existence exercises a healthful restraint
on the hierarchy of the union. The effect of this self-discipline
can be perceived in comparative statistics of International Executive Board review of disciplinary cases appealed from the local
unions. In the two-year period immediately preceding creation
59 According to Professor Summers, only two of 154 union constitutions studied, that
of the UAW and of the Inland :Boatmen, expressly allow legal counsel to an accused member in disciplinary proceedings. Summers, "Disciplinary Procedures of Unions,'' 4 !ND. &
LAB. REL. R.Ev. 15 at 17 (1950). "79 unions provide that the defendant shall have counsel.
74 of these specifically provide that he shall be a member in good standing, 3 do not state
who he shall be, and 2 expressly permit lawyers." Id., n. 5.
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of the Public Review Board, 1955-57, of the fifteen such cases
appealed to the International Executive Board, ten were affirmed,
two resulted in modification of penalties, and three were reversed.
By way of contrast, in the year immediately following creation of
the Public Review Board, nine such appeals were heard by the
International Executive Board, only two of which resulted in
affirmance; two others resulted in modification of penalty, and
the other five were reversed. 60 It is thus apparent that the Executive Board affirmed, in terms of percentage, three times as many
of the decisions of the local tribunals in such cases in the two-year
period before creation of the Public Review Board as it did in the
first year thereafter.
There are other, less formal, respects in which the very availability of review by outsiders, who may not "understand," tends
to qualify the actions of leadership. Suffice it, for present purposes, to say that all of this qualification is for the good, in my
judgment, as measured by the yardstick of maintenance of organizational integrity. The pressures of impartial review are in the
direction of adherence to (and re-examination of) the law of the
union and the concomitant protection of the individual rights
of members thereunder; they are, at the same time, away from the
loose practice that is conducive to arbitrariness and politicallyoriented exercise of power.

C.

The Counseling Service

The law of a union is no more self-applying than any other
kind of law. For the rights accorded by such law to be meaningful, awareness of their existence and of where and how to realize
them is necessary. Ordinarily, this function falls to lawyers, but,
as a practical matter, lawyers are not available to union members
with respect to intra-organizational affairs. The problem is further
accentuated by the incongruous fact that while advice as to rights
under the law of society at large is permitted to be given only by
licensed practitioners, 61 advice as to rights under the law of the
union is, by reason of expense, inconvenience, and the stigma attaching within such ranks to law and lawyers, 62 effectively preUAW Public Review Board, First Annual Report, note 9 supra, at 5.
Bump v. District Court of Polk County, 232 Iowa 623, 5 N.W. (2d) 914 (1942).
62 See Summers, "Disciplinary Procedures of Unions," 4 IND. & LAB. REL. R.Ev. 15 at
17 (1950).
60

61E.g.,
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eluded in most instances from other than fellow workers and union
functionaries.
Nor can responsibility for such advice be safely left in all cases
with the union officials, chiefly local, to whom the aggrieved member might have reasonable access. They are frequently themselves
ignorant of the member's rights in the particular case under the
law of the union; they are frequently not disinterested; they are
always busy, and frequently too busy, with what they, perhaps
rightfully, consider problems of higher priority. In the unionversus-management climate, they are sometimes prone to think of
member-versus-union problems as nuisances.
The present-day labor leader's world is group-oriented. He
tends to think in terms of collectivity, of security for the group.
He is, as a consequence, a questionable custodian of individual
rights, at least of individual rights against or affecting the union
group itself. Moreover, his inclination is to measure all individual
interests in terms of their impact upon the union group. 63 In most
cases, fortunately, the group interests are likely to be coincident
with the interests of the individual members of the group, fully
perceived, the former being simply the collective embodiment of
the latter. But at the point of essential conflict the contemporary
labor leader is apt to reflect a group set. Adherence to a kind of
"party line" becomes the course of virtue, the practice of individualism at best a qualified vice.
In seeking to resolve this conflict, it is easiest to rationalize the
extremes. As usual, however, wisdom would seem to lie along a
line of nice accommodation. And the very premise of impartial
review - that the member needs protection within and against
the organization - renders it an appropriate vehicle for approximating this adjustment. A substantial part of its effort may properly be directed toward a counseling service by means of which
confused and aggrieved members may obtain information as to
their rights within the union, including the right of appeal to the
reviewing authority itself.
This would amount to more than a guide service, ideally,
since a prior communication to the union, with a request for a
follow-up report, might sensitize the available procedures for the
aggrieved member. In the case of the Public Review Board such a
63See Aaron, "Unions and Civil Liberties: Claims vs. Performance," 53 N.W. UNIV.
L. R:Ev. l (1958); Williams, "The Political Liberties of Labor Union Members," 32 TEX.
L. R:Ev. 826 (1954).
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program has worked quite effectively in some instances, the degree
of success varying with the concern, initiative, and union influence
of the international staff member assigned to liaison with the board
at the particular time. Some of the most gratifying accomplishments of the board have come in matters never maturing to "cases"
before it because of early resolution through informal handling.
The potential of an informal program of this sort for bridging the
gulf between big organization and little member has barely been
touched.

D.

The Matter of Voluntarism

Obviously, impartial review could be other than voluntary.64
For example, a governmental agency, perhaps the National Labor
Relations Board, could be given jurisdiction over intra-union
grievances. 65 Or a kind of industrial court might be created to
pass upon the same. 66 Or the reviewing authority might be placed
in the Department of Labor, or left with the courts under a
broader grant of jurisdiction than they have been traditionally
willing to assert. 67 Although the strengths and weaknesses of involuntary review would vary with the technique adopted, it seems
to me the potential benefits in the broader sense are these: it
could reach all unions subject to federal jurisdiction; it could
64 For a discussion of some of the possible techniques, see Levitan, "Government Reg•
ulation of Internal Union Affairs Affecting the Rights of Members," BNA DAILY LAB.
REP. No. 109, 25-26 Uune 4, 1958); Williams, "The Political Liberties of Labor Union
Members," 32 TEX. L. REv. 826 at 835-838 (1954); Aaron and Komaroff, "Statutory Regulation of Internal Union Affairs-II," 44 !LL. L. REv. 631 (1949).
65 NLRB proceedings patterned after unfair labor practice procedure have been incorporated in past bills before Congress. See the articles cited in note 64 supra for evaluation and criticism of such an approach. A procedure paralleling the provisions of §10 (k)
of the Taft-Hartley Act, providing for determination of a jurisdictional dispute by the
NLRB if the parties themselves do not submit it to arbitration or otherwise settle it, has
been suggested. See Williams, note 64 supra, at 836: "It is here proposed . . . that the
National Labor Relations Act be amended to provide for Board settlement of union discipline cases under a standard of 'just cause,' which power can be exercised only if the
union refuses to submit the dispute to an impartial arbitrator for final and binding decision on the same standard of 'just cause.' "
66 J. B. S. Hardman has suggested a "Court of Intra-Union Relations." "The thought
is patterned on the idea of the courts of domestic relations. Discipline and cohesion are
essential to the maintenance of unions as effective organizations, even as they are essential
in family life. The reasoning that went into the setting up of the family courts is applicable
to the problems of union democracy. Labor leaders, in the higher echelons, love to refer
to their unions as the labor or union family." Hardman, "Legislating Union Democracy,"
THE NEW LEADER, Dec. 2, 1957, 3 at 7.
67 See Aaron and Komaroff, "Statutory Regulation of Internal Union Affairs-II,'' 44
!LL. L. REv. 631 at 665-674 (1949), for a favorable comment upon the enlargement of
judicial review as a technique of supervision. Professor Williams, on the other hand, has
summarized the case against this approach. Williams, "The Political Liberties of Labor
Union Members,'' 32 TEX. L. REv. 826 at 835·836 (1954).
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establish a uniform scope of review; it could, presumably, provide
an independent, competent tribunal and staff to assist it; the matter
of enforcement would be resolved. On the opposite side, in addition to public expense, the values of voluntarism might be lost.
Perhaps the most significant of these values is assurance of a
tribunal sophisticated as to labor matters and not motivated by
anti-union considerations.
It is not my purpose at this time to weigh the gain against the
loss. I feel obliged to note, however, that just as the hallmark of
civilization is "obedience to the unenforceable," 68 so does an
organization manifest its dedication to civility and the principles of
democracy by the discipline it voluntarily assumes. And it matures
through such dedication in a way not otherwise to be achieved.
The UAW is, in this sense, the beneficiary of the process of impartial review it has itself created. I should be concerned were
this path of self-growth to be foreclosed.
Accordingly, my hope is that any program of required review
which may be adopted will make provisions for self-imposed systems of review. 69 This might be accomplished ~hrough legislation
empowering a supervisory federal agency to review intra-union
grievances based upon alleged denial of the principles of selfgovernment and due process of law. The legislation might provide that the decisions of voluntary tribunals be accorded a strong
presumption of validity, perhaps even finality, on any appeal to the
supervisory agency, provided the jurisdictional grant, procedures,
and indicia of independence of the particular tribunal comply with
the standards laid down in the statute and the regulations of the
agency.70 In this way, the values of voluntarism might be preserved
68 Lord Moulton, "Law and Manners,'' 134 THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, July, 1924, p. 1,
excerpted in CHEATHAM, CAsES ON THE LEGAL PROFFSSION, 2d ed., 124 (1955).
69 See LESTER, As UNIONS MATURE 152 (1958). An AFL-CIO impartial review board
might, for example, be created with jurisdiction ceded to it by such of the affiliated unions
as choose to participate, much after the fashion of the AFL-CIO "No-Raiding Agreement"
approach to the problem of jurisdictional disputes. [This pact, providing for submission of
such disputes to an impartial umpire, became effective for signatory unions in 1954. See,
e.g., United Textile Workers v. Textile Workers Union, (7th Cir. 1958) 42 L.R.R.M. 2605.]
If necessary, subordinate impartial tribunals might also be created, perhaps for each of
the six departments of the AFL-CIO: Building Trades, Industrial Union, Maritime Trades,
Metal Trades, Railway Employees, Union Label.
70 Professor Cox has suggested that the Secretary of Labor might be authorized "to
issue periodic certificates exempting a union from governmental enforcement proceedings
••. upon a finding that the union had established an independent appeal board under the
auspices of which a union member . . . would receive at least as great protection" as at
the instance of the government. Cox, "The Role of Law in Preserving Union Democracy,"
72 HARV. L. REv. 609 at 623 (1959).
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to the extent consonant with generic impartial review. At the
same time, voluntarism is shored up against its inherent weakness
- its dependence upon the continuing good will of the very leadership it exists to circumscribe - by the federal sanctions in reserve.

V.

CONCLUSION

Detailed consideration of the procedures developed by, and the
cases and complaints presented to, the Public Review Board71 has
been purposely omitted in this paper. My aim for the present
has been to share a few impressions which may help to establish perspective. I have suggested that the broad function of voluntary impartial review is to maintain the integrity of the organization.
Some kind of independent "judiciary" is necessary to accomplish
this in large, highly political organizations such as labor unions.
The leadership is otherwise left to interpret the law it executes in
accordance with its own political interests and its own ideas of
what is good for the organization and the membership. The
problems of paternalism, special interest, and impersonality are
inherent in this context of bureaucracy.
It follows that the primary yardstick of voluntary impartial
review is the law of the organization. Where ambiguity forces
resort to outside criteria, these should include the larger law and
its imports, that is, what civil courts might consider in passing on
the matter. This would lead to a better definition of the sources
of guidance for impartial review; also, the decisions rendered
would approximate those that well-advised courts might be expected to reach on review of the impartial tribunal.
Of the arguments that might be directed against the approach
I have suggested, one in particular disturbs me to the point of
further consideration. Much has been said and written about the
need for protecting the "civil rights" of union members,72 a concern I profoundly share. Some who espouse this view may find my
suggestions too allegiant to the law of the union and thus too restrictive of impartial review. This contention would be grounded,
I presume, on the thesis that the framers of the union law cannot
71 These cases, complaints, and procedures are reported in the Public Review Board's
First Annual Report, note 9 supra.
72 See, e.g., ACLU, DEMOCRACY IN LABOR UNIONS; Williams, "The Political Liberties of
Labor Union Members," 32 TEX. L. REv. 826 (1954); Summers, "Union Powers and Workers' Rights,'' 49 MICH. L. REv. 805 (1951); Kovner, "The Legal Protection of Civil Liberties
Within Unions,'' 1948 WJS. L. REv. 18; Witwer, "Civil Liberties and the Trade Unions,''
50 YALE L.J. 621 (1941).
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be trusted to evince sufficient legislative concern for basic substantive and procedural rights. Without intending to minimize
this apprehension, I should like to advance some counter-considerations that seem to me persuasive.
(1) It is important, initially, to recognize the premise underlying my suggestions, viz., that of voluntary impartial review. A
program assumed voluntarily has much to commend it, even
though it be concededly more limited in scope than an imposed
program. More use of the voluntary program may be expected
where there is confidence of nice attention by the impartial tribunal to the law of which it is a creature.73
(2) The greater the loyalty of the impartial tribunal to the
law of the union the more consistent it will be with the pattern
of arbitration under collective bargaining agreements.74 A valuable momentum is thus available for an impartial review of intraunion disputes similarly oriented.
(3) The question of whether the impartial tribunal should
look beyond the law of the union is academic in most cases likely
to reach it. The tribunal will usually be obliged to look beyond
such law, in any event, because of ambiguities within that law
as applied to the particular circumstances. An appropriate aggres- ·
siveness on the part of the tribunal wherever civil rights are arguably infringed should permit the protection of these rights about
as fully through working from within the union law as could be
done through an express approach from without.
(4) It is, moreover, delusive to suppose that the impartial
reviewers would be in such accord as to "civil liberties," "substantive and procedural due process," and "public policy," as to
agree readily on the meaning of any or all of these concepts as
applied to particular cases. Lay members of impartial tribunals
may reasonably be expected to have differences as to these criteria.
Judges and lawyers are in frequent disagreement. The alternative,
then, to adherence to the law of the union, except where the latter
is for some reason inconclusive, is not apt to be adherence to some
73 It is significant that the forerunner in this field, the Upholsterers' International
Union, has specified that the decisions of its appeal board "shall be based solely on the
facts and the provisions of these General Laws." Note 28 supra.
'74 The usual language of arbitral restriction is that the arbitrator "shall have no
power to add to, subtract from, or modify any provision" of the agreement. In practice,
this is, of course, more a matter of emphasis than of literal limitation. See ELKoURI, How
ARBITRATION WoRKS 30-34, 130-134 (1952); UPDEGRAFF AND McCoY, ARBITRATION OF l.ABoR
DISPUTES 29 (1946).
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simple, well-understood set of precepts. On the other hand, where
the union law plainly violates some fundamental concept of individual right, the members of the impartial tribunal, even accepting the law of the union as their standard, might properly
deny effect to the patently invalid provision715 and thus anticipate
the result should the case be reviewed in the courts.76
(5) Voluntary impartial review is not necessarily to be
equated with judicial review. All factors considered, more may
be accomplished if not too much is attempted. It is no insignificant
achievement to assure the integrity of the union process as measured by the union law. The strengths of the union law are thus
fully developed and the weaknesses revealed. Moreover, review by
the courts, which is still available, is simplified in the issue-sharpening light of the intermediate review.
(6) Emphasis upon the law of the union should tend to focus
organizational attention upon such law and its process. The result
should be a degree of introspection and re-evaluation not similarly
attainable with the accent on criteria imported from outside. The
factors of self-discipline and self-growth are thus enhanced.
(7) Where impartial review accepts the law of the organization as its essential standard but resolves all ambiguities in favor
of civil rights, such action, if well publicized,77 should effectively
preclude all infringing practices not expressly sanctioned by blackletter provisions in the union law. This would have two healthful
consequences: (a) The leadership would be reluctant to ask for,
and the membership to enact, such naked infringements. (b) If
the civil right is expressly curtailed, despite this deterrence, the
curtailment is out in the open for the examination and curative
reaction of the full membership, the public, Congress, and the
courts. The camouflage of vague constitutional language and littleknown leadership decisions would no longer be available.
(8) Finally, if protection of civil rights is to be brought more
affirmatively to the internal union, it seems to me that the route
715 For analogous situations in which arbitrators have refused effect to offending provisions of collective bargaining agreements, see ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 172-175
(1952).
76 See note 29 supra.
77 The decisions of the UAW Public Review Board are issued in full text not only to
the parties, broadly defined, but also to all interested news media, and to observers of the
labor scene who have so requested. They are further reported to the membership in
summary fashion in the board's annual reports pursuant to art. 31, §7 of the UAW Constitution. See note 9 supra.
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lies ideally through incorporation of these rights into union constitutions. The initial effort should be to induce unions to adopt
model constitutional provisions affirming certain minimal standards of substantive and procedural due process.78 A definite
step in this direction has already been taken in the AFL-CIO
Codes of Ethical Practices. Code VI, entitled "Union Democratic
Processes," sets forth in general form the "basic democratic rights"
which "should be guaranteed" by "any affiliated union." These
rights, the more important of which are set forth in the margin,79
have been incorporated in toto in the UAW constitutional provision empowering the Public Review Board "to deal with matters related to alleged violation of any AFL-CIO ethical practices
codes."80 Similar adopion is urged in Code VI upon all affiliated
unions "at the earliest practicable time."81
The premise of the foregoing considerations is an impartial
review voluntarily assumed. It is obviously too much to hope of all
union leadership, and perhaps too much to expect of any, that they
voluntarily accept a system of review the very function of which
is to curtail leadership power. On the other hand, it is not only
feasible but desirable, I think, to seek to preserve the values of
voluntarism within any system of imposed review. The strengths
and weaknesses of the voluntary and the imposed seem singularly
complementary.
78 A "Bill of Rights" is a standard omission in union constitutions. See Williams,
"The Political Liberties of Labor Union Members," 32 TEX. L. REY. 826 at 832 (1954) for
pertinent comment.
70 1. The right to "full and free participation in union self-government," including
(a) "to vote periodically [at least once every four years] for his local and national officers,
either directly by referendum vote or through delegate bodies," (b) "to honest elections,"
(c) "to stand for and hold union office," (d) "to voice •.• views as to the method in which
the union's affairs should be conducted."
2. The right "to fair treatment in the application of union rules and law," including
due process in any disciplinary proceedings.
3. The right to criticize union policies and leaders without, however, undermining
"the union as an institution."
4. The right to regular open conventions, at least once every four years.
5. The right to government in accordance with "the provisions of the union's constitution" and "the decisions of the convention.''
6. The right to periodic membership meetings of local unions "with proper notice of
time and place.''
80 Art. 31, §3.
81 It has been suggested that by statute some of the principles of the AFL-CIO codes
could be made "Federal standards with which all unions would have to comply, but with
latitude-in the means by which compliance is accomplished.'' This latitude would include
the establishment of voluntary impartial review boards. LEsn:R, As UNIONS MATURE 152,
146-147 (1958).

